Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12104/83284
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dc.creatorJuárez-Luna, David-
dc.date2016-01-20-
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-14T19:26:32Z-
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-14T22:06:06Z-
dc.date.available2021-07-14T19:26:32Z-
dc.date.available2021-07-14T22:06:06Z-
dc.identifierhttps://econoquantum.cucea.udg.mx/index.php/EQ/article/view/4869/6261-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12104/83284-
dc.descriptionIdeas about ethnicity, religion, and nationalism among others, which we label “ideology”, seem to affect the preferences of voters, political parties and finally, the equilibrium policy. In this paper we provide a political-economic model that traces the influence of ideology on determining the tax rate in political competition. What we found is that, when the salience of ideology increases, the cohort of voters with the median ideological view become the swing voters. Then, the equilibrium tax rate benefits that cohort of voters. en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherUniversidad de Guadalajaraes-ES
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2016 EconoQuantumes-ES
dc.source2007-9869-
dc.source1870-6622-
dc.sourceEconoQuantum; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 Primer semestre 2016 First semester; 7-28en-US
dc.sourceEconoQuantum; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 Primer semestre 2016 First semester; 7-28es-ES
dc.subjectPolitical economyen-US
dc.subjectPolitical equilibriumen-US
dc.subjectIdeologyen-US
dc.subjectSwing votersen-US
dc.subjectD72en-US
dc.subjectP16en-US
dc.titleIdeology, swing voters, and taxationen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion-
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